
Netanyahu Denies Reports Saying He Rejected Sinwar Assassination Proposal Before Oct. 7th
In the days leading up to the tragic events of October 7, 2023, an internal debate unfolded within Israel’s security establishment. According to a report by Channel 12 news, Ronen Bar, the head of the Shin Bet security service, recommended on October 1, 2023, that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu authorize the targeted assassination of Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza. This proposal came just six days before Hamas launched a devastating attack on southern Israel, resulting in the loss of 1,200 lives and the abduction of 251 individuals.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has categorically denied these claims, stating that during the October 1 meeting, the discussions centered around potential targeted operations in Gaza. The PMO asserts that Bar’s actual recommendation was to offer civilian incentives to Hamas to maintain calm, rather than pursuing an assassination strategy.
The Channel 12 report, which draws from internal Shin Bet investigations into the failures surrounding October 7, suggests a profound misjudgment of Hamas’s intentions by the security agency. In the early hours of October 7, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Bar convened with senior Shin Bet officials after observing unusual activities within Hamas. Notably, there was a sudden activation of numerous SIM cards in Gaza and the movement of senior Hamas military figures into underground tunnels.
Initially, Bar suspected that these actions indicated a forthcoming Hamas infiltration into Israel, albeit on a limited scale involving dozens of militants. However, as the night progressed, reassurances from senior Shin Bet officials led him to believe that these signs were defensive measures by Hamas, anticipating a potential Israeli offensive. This assessment was communicated to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. Despite lingering concerns, Bar dispatched two counterterrorism units to the Gaza border as a precaution against possible minor attacks.
By 5 a.m., a decision was made to cancel a scheduled security cabinet meeting on October 8, to avoid any misinterpretation by Hamas that could escalate tensions. It wasn’t until 6:29 a.m., as the large-scale assault by Hamas commenced, that Prime Minister Netanyahu was briefed on the unfolding situation.
This incident has ignited a broader discourse on the strategic approaches employed by Israel’s leadership concerning Hamas. The Shin Bet’s internal reviews highlight a consistent underestimation of Hamas’s military capabilities and intentions. While successive Shin Bet chiefs, including Yoram Cohen, Nadav Argaman, and Ronen Bar, recognized the growing threat posed by Hamas, their appeals for decisive actions, such as the elimination of leaders like Sinwar and military commander Muhammad Deif, were reportedly overlooked in favor of maintaining a status quo of “quiet in return for quiet.”
The PMO has refuted these allegations, labeling the report as “a complete lie.” They maintain that the October 1 meeting focused on strategies to sustain peace through non-military means, contrary to the claims of a proposed assassination plan.